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Common pool resources (CPRs) are safe-guards and foundation for rural livelihood 
especially for the developing nations like India. Cooperation is needed to conserve CPRs due 
to its very features. Community institutions sometimes face conflicts to conserve commons 
cost-effectively. But, are conflicts always detrimental? Do they always hamper the local 
governance of commons? We have tried to view from close the activities of commons users 
and others and tried to understand the underlying symphony thereafter. In doing so, we have 
conducted a primary survey on 419 users of canal water, community forest and tank water 
in 11 CPRs dependent villages from West Bengal, India. We observed positive relations 
between conflict and collective action in conservation of commons. This finding seems to be 
conflicting with the notion that, conflict undermines collective action and therewith the 
potential for sustainability. We examined and found that successful informal communities are 
more conflictive and at the same time cooperative than formal one. We tried to see the 
working of different factors influencing collective action and conflicts. We also viewed the role 
of formal and informal institution in this orchestra of CPRs. The occurrences of supply, demand 
and policy side conflicts and conflict resolution methods are also not significantly different 
between formal and informal institutions. Therefore, conflict and informal institution have 
some positive impact for the successful conservation. We suggest that authorities have to 
study the nature and types of conflicts before implementing rules and institutional 
arrangements thereafter. 
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Long before human civilization came into existence the earth was undergoing a 
continuous course of increasing its diverse environmental wealth which remained the 
foundation, the prime guiding force of human civilization. But, especially over the past few 
decades the marvel of blue planet is diminishing and we, her children observe with pain, the 
degradation every day. With this observation, we focus our attention on common pool 
resources (CPRs). The CPRs like biodiversity, biomass resources, canal irrigation, community 
fisheries, forest, land, livestock and tank water for irrigation have been degrading rapidly and 
causing the environmental crisis in general and agrarian crisis in particular in various 
developing countries. These are due to increase in unplanned industrialization and 
urbanization, population growth, demand supply disparity, climate and temperature change. 
Commons are semi-public goods1 in nature and so potential beneficiaries cannot be 
excluded from using it. But, this leads to over-extraction and consequently to the tragedy of 
commons (Hardin 1968). According to Coase (1936), the solution to tragedy of commons is 
to hand over property right which internalizes the externality. But, this is not easy to impose 
due to high transaction cost, political inefficiency, asymmetric information and non-
participation of local community etc. As a result, market approach and command and control 
based approach failed to manage commons. In some environments, higher social capital and 
collective action arrangements among commons’ users can solve conflicts, free riding, non 
cooperation and divergence from a set of rules (Ostrom 1990; Pretty 2003). Pretty (2003) 
and other scholar have given much credence to the significance of social capital in commons. 
North (1990), Azuela (2006) and Nemarundwe (2003) claimed that institutional designs grant 
bargaining power of individuals or communities in commons conservation (Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999). A number of studies have attempted to address the mechanisms to manage 
commons sustainably2. The approach looked at prominent role of conflicts in canal water, 
fishery, forest, watershed and tank water irrigation management such as Kerr (2007), 
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002), Andersson et al. (2009),Janssen et al. (2011), Nygren 
(2000), Sarkar (2017a, 2017b), Sarkar and Ray (2019), Degen et al.(2000), Ostrom (1992), 
                                                          
1 Due to features of CPR, exclusion of individual users is difficult to achieve and joint use involves subtractibility, 
i.e., the use of a resource by one person will subtract from another persons’ enjoyment of the resource (Steins and 
Edwards 1998). 
2Sustainable CPR conservation means that the demands of present generation cannot be the sole basis for deciding on 
appropriate solutions to CPRs use conflicts; needs of future generations and society in general needs to be considered 
as well (Muchena and van der Bliek 1997). 
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Ostrom and Gardner (1993), Lubellet al. (2002), Sneddon (2002) and Suliman (1999). In 
CPRs literature Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and Vedeld (2000) found that misinterpretation 
of individual and consequent conflicts between individual members and sub-groups within a 
user’s community are regularly reported. This may emerge counter-intuitive, because 
commons management requires cooperation, which can be argued to be seriously slowed 
down by disagreement and conflict (Olson 1965). In the literature, conflict can be defined as 
‘‘any relationship between opposing forces whether marked by violence or not’’ (Desloges and 
Gauthier 1997). According to Ochieng Odhiambo (2000), ‘‘Each party wants to pursue its own 
interests to the full and in so doing ends up contradicting, compromising or even defeating 
the interest of the other.’’ As noted by O’Leary and Bingham (2003) and Laerhoven and 
Andersson (2013), conflicts emerge from differences in values and worldviews, interests and 
uncertainty that surround various courses of action. We define conflict in commons 
conservation as – Power, Policy and Property (PPP) owners cleverly allocate more benefit and 
less cost in self-favour leaving the opposite for (their neighbor) Poor People (PP). Generally, 
the goal and objectives of rich (PPP) and the powerful may not be harmonious with the needs 
of the poor (PP) and the marginalized (Johnson et al. 2005; Baland and Platteau 1999). 
Literature reviews have shown that successful management of commons actually refers to 
community-based natural resource conflict management model (CBNRCMM). These studies 
view conflict deteriorate trust, which, in turn, drives cooperation negatively for higher 
transaction cost (Sarkar and Ray 2019). Thus, conflict can and must be settled at any cost. 
But, some practical verifications show the opposite.  
Therefore, a couple of queries on commons conservation emerge. Is conflict always 
detrimental to collective action and conservation? If conflicts undermine trust, does formal 
institution resolve conflicts? How do institutions 3 , if at all, matter in moderating the 
detrimental impacts of conflicts? This research departs from this predictable analysis of 
conflict in commons. If conflict in commons undermines trust and cooperation, and if collective 
action in turn is necessary for the conservation of the commons, why we notice many 
evidences of conflicts where successful commons management goes together with reports of 
conflicts between its communities? Why conflictive informal institutions are also successful? 
Are the types of conflicts and mode of handling conflict different between formal and informal 
institutions?  
In this study, it is argued that the articulation of disagreement and the consequent 
                                                          
3We use the words ‘commons’ interchangeably with common-pool resources. We focus here on smaller-scale natural 
resources, although commons exist at multiple scales and in all aspects of human society and ‘institutions’ and ‘rules’ 
interchangeably (North 1990). 
Sustainability, Agri, Food and Environmental Research, (ISSN: 0719-3726), 9(2), 2021: 185-204 




probability of conflict within commons user community are both inherent and necessary 
components of self-governance arrangements and a factor that complicates the organisation 
of the collective action and institutions (formal and informal) that are necessary to prevent 
tragedy of commons. Conflict may at the same time be indispensable and unwanted for 
sustainable management. We will also attempt to compare formal and informal institutions 
as we assume, both types, with their notable differences could have distinct influences on 
human behaviour towards sustainable management of commons.  
We particularly explore the role of collective action (conflict) and institution. We 
examine the view that informal conflictive communities are also successful. On the basis of 
robust empirical instance we show that the more successful informal commons user 
communities also experience significantly more internal conflicts. In the following section, I 
discuss the study perspective along with the hypotheses. Finally, details of data collection and 
analysis, results, discussion and conclusion and recommendation and research gap will come 
up serially.  
 
STUDY PERSPECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES 
 Evolution of Collective Action: ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ has been dominant in the 
discussion of sustainable management of commons (Baland and Plateau 1996). Hardin (1968) 
claimed that CPRs have been overexploited due to maximum use by individual. Privatisation 
or state regulation can play a major role to end their tragedy. Hardin used the term ‘commons’ 
to describe an open access grazing land situation (Steins and Edwards 1998). The methods 
were criticised for overlooking the actuality that many user communities have successfully 
managed commons by developing and maintaining self-governing 4  institutions (Ostrom 
1990). This criticisem has led to the development of common property theory, theory of 
collective action5, social capital theories6 and game theory about institutions from various 
disciplines. Today, there is no single extensively accepted or integrated theory on the 
applicable institutions for commons management (Agrawal 2001). In some circumstances, 
high and positive levels of social capital and collective action arrangements can mitigate 
commons management problems. Canal water, community forest and tank water are 
                                                          
4 Governance includes the design institutions, setting of rules, the application of rules and the enforcement 
and adjudication of rules (Fenny 1988).  
5 Collective action emerges when the joint efforts of two or more individuals are needed to accomplish an 
common outcome (Sandler 1992).  
6 Social capital is the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, connectedness and expectations 
about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity (Ostrom 1999). 
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important commons that contribute to rural livelihoods. Collective action is necessary to 
sustain the resources and the resource-based earnings. Davies et al. (2004) distinguish two 
types of collective actions which are cooperation and coordination. Cooperation implies 
bottom-up, farmer-to-farmer collective action, while coordination means top-down as well as 
agency-led collective action. 
Collective action is important in preservation of commons as it affect proper 
management and, hence, has a direct bearing on the regeneration of commons in terms of 
agricultural productivity and income. There are different indicators of collective action related 
to commons, community and institutional arrangement and nestedness (figure 1). These 
include: investment in terms of time, resources and financial base; open and equal 
participation in decision-making; attitude towards the member of these groups, equality in 
benefit allocation; economic and livelihood impacts and reduction in vulnerability; mutual 
trust, internal norms and role clarity within community and participation in conflict resolution; 
setting the level of penalty, sanction (social or monetary), providing reward; information 
sharing and sense of accountability; knowledge sharing, spreading awareness and external 
nested linkage; building safety measures to avoid accidents; conservation of assets and 
technological progress. 
 To draw the hypotheses and also to link collective action and institutions with 
conservation of commons and conflicts, we rely on Meizen-Dick et al. (2004) and Sarkar and 
Ray (2019). Figure 1 suggests that a common setup for collective action is described by the 
characteristics of commons, community and institutional arrangements and nestedness. 
These determine collective action and we assume that it, in turn, positively affect conservation 
of commons and conflicts.  
Determining Variables                                                             Conservation 
 Commons  
 Community   
 Institutional arrangements  
and nestedness   
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 Figure 1: Development of collective action. Source: Sarkar and Ray (2019) with 
modification 
A review engenders substantial optimism of decentralization policy to solve conflicts. 
But, non-cooperation needs to be addressed prior to cooperation about the institutional 
arrangements. There is a propensity to analyse ‘conflict’ and ‘commons conservation’ as 
separate and only successively related. Our implicit claim is that conflict is also consistent 
with sustainable commons governance. The conservation of commons may often require 
conflicts in order to change the existing governance and institutional arrangements for better. 
Successful community with high levels of collective action does not necessarily imply without 
conflicts. 
Against this backdrop, we consider the following first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: conflict and collective action in commons are positively related.  
 
           Institutional Arrangement and Conflict Management: A number of study have 
investigated the different nature and types of institutions that persuade human behaviour and 
hence the sustainability of commons. Though, different points of views are instituted in 
prioritising the significance of formal and informal institutions, few scholars carry the design 
of North (1990) that both formal and informal institutions are important to attain 
sustainability. Informal institutions are often well-known as social norms. According to Posner 
(1997), social norms are specified force by four types of incentives for individuals to follow 
them. Firstly, some norms are self-enforcing because they are nuts and bolts to advantageous 
transactions. Secondly, they can be enforced by social disapproval, the effectiveness lies in 
its hidden danger of exclusion from ongoing advantageous transactions. Thirdly, compliance 
with norms might sometimes be due to emotional reasons. Finally, norms might be 
internalised and therefore obeyed to avoid feelings of guilt or shame. He recognised that in 
any given situation compliance is likely to be affected by a mix of these incentives. But, Ribot 
et al. (2008) claimed that the existence of democratic formal institutions is vital for 
conservation of commons. Others noted that the cooperation of stakeholders in the decision-
making of sustainable commons conservation matters more than the type of institutional 
arrangement. Such institutions guarantee the rights of commons users and prevent external 
users from benefiting from the community’s conservation activities (Pagdee et al. 2006). A 
system of authority within the community of commons users and external support in the 
enforcement of rules helps to stabilise institutions that conserve commons in a sustainable 
manner (Chakraborty 2001).  
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Most authorities and agencies have underrated the capacity of local groups to 
participate effectively in commons management programmes (Esenjoraf 2004), some 
investigators noted that even those project which depend on community involvement have 
not been effective in targeting the poor (Mansuri and Rao 2004). The relationship of the 
community with the external authorities and the institutional designs which govern human 
behaviour towards sustainability is crucial (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The term institution is 
conceptualized by different authors in different ways. The definition by North (1990) is used 
as the main point of reference, because it emphasises the differences between the formal and 
informal natures that institutions could have 7  (table 1). Informal institutions are 
arrangements of rules and decision-making methods which have evolved from endogenous 
socio cultural backgrounds and give rise to social practices, assign roles to users and guide 
interactions among them (Appiah-Opoku and Mulamoottil 1997). Formal institutions refer to 
the rules that guide access, control and conservation of commons and which are backed up 
and enforced by the state (Leach et al. 1997).  
The fundamental role played by institutions is being increasingly recognised in 
development studies (Ghate and Nagendra 2005). The discourse among scholars has 
emphasised on the success of different types of institutional designs. Studying institutions 
that govern CPRs conservation is crucial as CPRs are vital assets for the poor people (PP). 
Moreover, most of the biodiversity in developing nation (DN) reside in the commons, 
especially under systems of low intensity management (Lovett et al. 2006). Commons are 
means of livelihood for many rural people and rural poverty alleviation in DN requires its 
sustainable management. However, sufficient studies are not available on the effectiveness 
of institutions in sustainable management of CPRs. This literature review will therefore try to 
throw some light on the effectiveness of institutions in this field by comparing the 
effectiveness of formal and informal institutions there (table 1). 
Table 1: Differences between informal and formal institutions 
Features Informal Formal 
Evolution Endogenous Exogenous 
Nestedness Low High 
External support Low High 
Social embeddedness High Low 
Enforcement and monitoring Community State 
                                                          
7There are various types of institutions such as formal and informal, indigenous and non-indigenous, local and 
external, traditional and non-traditional, endogenous and exogenous, and de facto and de jure referring to different 
aspects of institutions including enforcement characteristics, origins, presence of cultural element, and property rights. 
But, we have considered the terms formal and informal institutions whether backed by state law or not in the existing 
condition. 
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Source: Author’s understanding 
              If in an organization monitoring, appropriation, provision, conflict resolution and 
overall governance activities are structured in multiple layers of nested enterprises, it is more 
likely to succeed. In our context, cooperation among resource users, social norms, self-
enforcement and monitoring by social disposal and compliance with norms are better in 
informal community. We see the types of institution, formal as well as informal of a resource 
user community in shaping the nature and extent of collective action (conflicts). The 
framework (figure 1) further suggests that collective actions emerge from the group size 
(community) and heterogeneities (Sarkar 2000a) and the associated conflicts relating to 
formal and informal institution of the group. The framework also suggests that outcome can 
be affected directly by the determining factors. 
            Therefore, we consider the following second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: successful informal communities are more conflictive and cooperative than 
formal community.  
 
 Conflict in Commons and Resolution: According to literature review, collective action 
(conflict) and conservation of commons are very closely related. Community faces various 
types of conflict (Appendix A) in canal irrigation, community forest and tank irrigation (Sarkar 
2017a; Sarkar 2017b; Sarkar and Ray 2019; Sarkar 2020b). We categorize conflicts as supply 
side, demand side and policy side conflicts (table 2). Supply side conflicts connect to the 
maturity or optimal size of the resource units and the productive nature of the resource. It 
generally arises from deficient investments in the conservation and regeneration in protection 
and in depletion of commons. Demand side conflicts are linked to address allocating the 
resources in an efficient and equitable manner. The policy side or management and external 
user side conflicts (“Body” as used by local people instead of executive committee members 
in forest and water masters in the canal and tank irrigation) between communities, manager 
(policy maker) and external or outside users. Policy side conflicts are closely connected with 
the design of institution. 
Table 2: The types of conflict in commons 
TYPES OF CPR CONFLICTS 
Supply Side Demand Side Policy Side 
Conservation conflicts Extraction conflicts External users 
Protection conflicts Interfering conflicts Co-ordination failure 
Depletion conflicts Allocating conflicts Governance conflict 
Sustainability, Agri, Food and Environmental Research, (ISSN: 0719-3726), 9(2), 2021: 185-204 




Souse: Author’s understanding 
In our study sites the operational rules are both formal and informal. As in each setting 
the resource users themselves are the primary designers of the institutional arrangements, 
they are also the initial settlers of conflicts that come up. Even if the specific mechanism 
varies, people commonly rely on the following fundamental procedural modes to handle 
conflicts. Adjudication: dependence on judiciary where from final solution generates; 
Arbitration: a person or a group accepted by both conflicting side may offer some mutually 
agreeable solution; Avoidance: matters related to conflicts are generally mentioned within 
the periphery with no outside linkage; Coercion: imposing forcefully one’s decision upon the 
others; Mediation: selecting a mutually a third personas mediator; Negotiation: while people 
from within the group exchanging views to solve a conflict may voluntarily end up with an 
agreeable way out (Castro and Nielson2003). 
          Thus, we consider the following third and final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: presences of supply, demand and policy side conflicts and conflict resolution 
methods are not significantly different between formal and informal institutions. 
 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
Survey Site and Data Collection: Agriculture is the main activity of the villagers in our 
study sites. Poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and unequal earning opportunities have 
fostered social disparity as compared to their neighbours housed in better areas in or around 
the district head quarters with better communications, free or low cost educational and health 
care facilities. The villagers of Alipurduar site in particular and those in entire district in general 
are crippled with low earning opportunities and hence are almost solely dependent on forest. 
Agricultural activities are better in Bardhaman district. In fact, it is the best in the state of 
West Bengal. Here yield/acre, though low as compared with others state of India, tops West 
Bengal. The source of agricultural water is the community canal and tank water which irrigates 
245.63 thousand hectares of agricultural land. On the other hand, engagement of people of 
the villages of the West Midnapure district in secondary sector like the industry based on 
NTFPs, cement, paper and food processing industry moderately high than the other two 
districts. The forest area of this district is spread over 171935 hectares of land. Midnapure 
canal is the most important source of irrigation water (267.92 thousand hectares). Besides 
the canal, the district is also rich in tank water. Therefore, people of Bardhaman and West 
Midnapure are forest and canal water dependent. A recurrent phenomenon that adversely 
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affects the local economies of Alipurduar and West Midnapure is human-wildlife (elephant) 
conflict.  
The disparity in topological condition, development opportunity, biodiversity, economic 
dependency, human-wildlife (elephant) conflicts and persistent institution-people conflicts 
characterizes the study sites. 
To investigate the involvement of conflict and its influence on commons, we had 
selected randomly 419 households from eleven villages of the said districts of West Bengal, 
India (21°20′ to 27°32′ N and 85°50′ to 89°52′ E). The data used in this study was collected 
from the primary survey which was carried out from September 2016 to July 2017 and 
December 2018 to July 2019 in several intervals. We have also collected some secondary 
data from District Statistical Handbooks, West Bengal, India (Census 2011) and from records 
of Divisional Forest and Sectional Irrigation Office. We have got more authentic information 
only from formal institution. 
The questionnaires were pre-tested in the pilot survey. The households are mutually 
exclusive and less heterogeneous. Since the literacy level of the villagers is low the 
questionnaire was implemented on a face-to-face manner. We have also cross-checked the 
collected data with the local authority such as local self-government members, foresters, key 
informants like teachers of the local primary schools and the dwellers of neighboring villages. 
This two-step verification ensures the reliability of the collected data. 
Measurement of Variables: We have taken three variables to assess their impact on 
commons conservation. They are as under: 
Conflict: We measure conflict in terms of lack of cooperation (Sarkar 2017a). We have 
captured conflicts based on fifteen indicators from the last five seasons (Appendix A).  
          Collective action: We define collective action based on ten indicators following Sarkar 
and Ray (2019) and Sarkar (2020a).We have applied a five point Likert format (Likert 1932) 
with the response categories for each indicator ranging from very low (1) to very high (5) to 
assess collective action. Indicators are given the same weight for simplicity. We have 
calculated the mode value of each indicator in total scoring of the index which with the lowest 
score of 1, leads to a total score of 10 and with the highest score of 5, leads to a total score 
of 50.8 
                                                          
8Since the indicators are very much contextual, majority opinions are more important than the averages. Also, it is 
important to note that since the study villages are located side by side, they are less heterogeneous as mentioned earlier. 
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Institutional effectiveness: We have constructed a quantitative index based on 
qualitative and quantitative information to evaluate institutional effectiveness of the 
communities using 5 types of practice of the community and authority for conflict 
management (Sarkar 2017a). The information based on: (1) Alliance between community 
and authorities (Governmental Departmental Office) for conflict resolutions; (2) Success rate 
of the department for conflict resolutions (departmental hierarchy from base to the top); (3) 
Physical infrastructure (number of forest police or water master in the office against the 
sanctioned post)9; (4) Patrolling of the police (forest guard and water master). In this case 
the scoring rules are: every day is 10; 2-3 times in a week is 5 and no patrolling or a single 
day per week is 0 and (5) Types of punishment and reward. A combination of monetary and 
non-monetary is 10, either monetary or non-monetary is 5 and otherwise the score is 0.  
Statistical Analysis: We have used Spearman’s rank correlation, Chi squared and 
paired t tests for the data analyses. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3:General information of the studied villages 
Serial 
no. 



















F+T 55  77.29 















































(68.2)47.1  (68.2)21.1 Informal 
11 Suata (Bardhaman) C+F+T 326 (180.9)166.7 191.00 (180.9)14.1 Formal and Informal 
                                                          
9The scoring rules are from 1 to 3: more than 50 percent is 10; less than 50 percent is 5 and incase of absence the 
scoring value is 0. 
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Source: primary survey and blank cells imply that the particular CPR is not present in that 
village. In case of canal and tank irrigation figures in brackets indicate irrigated lands. 
Table 3 shows significant correlation between canal command area and the total 
irrigated area (p = 0.00). The table also shows significant relationship between total irrigated 
land and tank irrigated land (p = 0.052). We observed livelihoods of the village people are 
highly dependent on the presence of commons in the villages. It also shows the nature of 
institutional arrangement across the study villages. 




Canal Irrigation Community Forest Tank Irrigation 
State Irrigation and Waterways 
Department (Jalasampad Bhavan) 
 
Government of West Bengal Directorate 
of Forests (Aranya Bhavan) 
Absent 
District Divisional Office 
 
Divisional Forest Office 
 
Absent 











(panchayet in India) 
Village Absent Forest Protection Committee or Joint 
Forest Management 
Absent 
Source: Author’s understanding 
Table 4 shows the prevailing institutional arrangement present in the study site. It 
illustrate canal and tank irrigation is working without community level formal committees 
(water user association). Although, there are canal water departmental hierarchy and forest 
departmental hierarchy but no such departmental hierarchy is present in tank water. Local 
self-government is taking the responsibility for tank management. 
Table 5: Collective action and level of conflicts across commons 
Name of the 
village 




























































































  38 17 6 13 10 
Choukir Boss   15 42   50 
Gadadhar   54 38   50 
Gonna 33 34   17 34 50 
Joyalbhanga 4 18     10 
Lakshmiganj 24 26 19 32 13 21 50 
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Majhergram 37 33   26 31 50 
Pachami   35 24 4 19 20 
Salbani 8 19 31 27   30 
Shirsi 11 21   2 14 10 
Suata 39 31 27 29 19 26 50 
Source: primary survey and no of conflicts are in the last five seasons. 
Table 5 illustrates conflicts in tanks which indicate the occurrence of conflicts in tank 
resource and use of tank water as irrigation with village level cooperation. We found direct 
relation between conflicts and collective action (p = 0.013). This is rather surprising and 
supported by the finding of Laerhoven and Andersson (2013). We find not significant but 
negative relation between conflicts and collective action (p = 0.640) in forest. In canal 
irrigation, collective action and level of conflicts positively correlated (p = 0.000). Table shows 
conflicts are high in those villages which are also highly motivated to share water. Gibson et 
al. (2000) shown that conflicting resource user groups do not essentially fail to conserve their 
commons successfully over an extended period of time. A few possible explanations with 
reference to our study may be due to: the absence of water user associations (WUA) in canal 
and tank villages which are successfully operative with informal institutions only; moderate 
nestedness and resource units are mobile and are subject to seasonal exhaustion. 
We have seen the usefulness of institutions when they go hand in hand with their 
informal parallels. In the table 5 it appears that formal institutions like joint forest 
management committees (JFMCs) in community forest are normal trouble shooters and bring 
settles a good number of conflicts subsequently. On the other hand, having only informal 
institutions in canal and tank water irrigation (with high collective action) conflicts are high. 
 Table 3 and 5 illustrate the strength and weakness of the institutional arrangement 
across study villages. In most of the cases formal and combination of formal and informal 
institutions are simultaneously effective to resolve conflicts. On the other hand, informal 
institutions are more conflictive and cooperative to resolve conflicts. There are the results of 
social connectedness, mutual trust and respect among the villagers. But, informal institutions 
are not institutionally effective mostly. This result is also supported by Ostrom’s (2004) 
findings. 
Table 6:Types of conflicts across the commons  
 
Types of conflicts Canal Forestry Tank Formal Informal 
Supply Side(56) 8 37 11 37 19 
Demand Side(253) 96 103 54 103 150 
Policy Side(153) 52 79 22 79 74 
Source: Primary survey. 
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The types of conflicts of common-pool resources in supply side, demand side and policy 
side are illustrated in table 6. They are not significantly different between formal and informal 
(p = 0.430). This observation neither supports Posner (1973) nor against Ribot et al. (2008). 
But, the incidence of conflicts among canal irrigation, forest commons and tank irrigation (p 
= 0.001) are significantly different. These may be due to split of resource units stock and 
mobile units. It reveals that frequencies of conflicts have a close link with the institutional 
arrangement. 
  
Table 7: Conflict resolutions across the commons and institutions 
Mode to handle conflict Canal Forest Tank Formal Informal 
Adjustment 2 18 0 18 2 
Arbitration 27 60 11 60 38 
Avoidance 23 37 14 37 37 
Coercion 26 36 27 36 53 
Mediation 31 44 14 44 45 
Negotiation 47 24 21 24 68 
Source: primary survey. 
Table7 shows the method of conflict resolutions is different across the commons and 
institutions. It shows a significant difference between tank and forest resources (p = 0.005). 
Modes of handling conflicts are not significantly different between forest and canal (p = 
0.122). Although, both tank and canal resources are used for irrigation purpose, the methods 
of conflict management are significantly different (p = 0.065). Again, table shows no 
significant difference to conflict resolution methods between formal and informal institutions 
(p = 0.360). Therefore, the effectiveness of formal and informal institutions is same (North 
1990). 
As conclusion and policy implication, while identifying the ups and downs in CPRs 
overall development, we have come through some findings which, if used properly, may throw 
some hopeful rays on the lives of the resources and its users simultaneously. Ups like high 
collective action, timely and amicable settlement of conflicts and proper use of institutions in 
managing commons and, Downs, just the other ways round. These three variables in our 
research are crucial to maintain and/or improve the smile of CPRs sustainable. 
The conventional study observed high collective action (conflicts) implies low conflict 
(collective action) among resource users. This study shows collective action and conflicts go 
hand in hand especially with canal and tank water irrigation. Successful informal communities 
are more conflictive and cooperative to conserve commons. Different types of conflicts and 
resolution methods between the formal and informal community also not significantly 
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different. Therefore, some changes may generate from conflicts that promote cooperation 
and conservation of commons. We suggest that at least a mild degree of conflict is necessary 
for effective and appropriate institutional arrangements. Conflicts are high in communities 
where an underlying tendency for united action already exists. Government authorities have 
multiple roles to play in the governance of CPRs. Resource users are often found incapable in 
addressing troublesome problems alone. Authorities, in consultation with user representative 
may be in a better position to handle crucial situation and implement some appropriate 
agreements to solve different issues.  
Conflicts, generally defined as lack of cooperation among members, are subject to 
some limitations. This is because the definition varies in different socio-economic scenario. 
Significant gap left for future studies: identification of resource specific and area specific 
negative and positive conflicts and their settlement thereafter for the sustainable 
management of common pool resources. 
Conflicts are good if they do good and mature to cooperation…a life donor to life 
itself…a search that goes on and on. 
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Appendix A. Conflict in the commons 
Canal water Community forest Tank water 
Head-tail problem Absence of negotiators Free riding (water 
rate) 
Low quality of drainage-
Drains are lower than the 
land  
Illicit cutting of trees Drainage, dam, 
spout problem 
Outlet problem not properly 
functioning 
Grazing in forest and rangeland Appropriation of 
resources 
Clearing or, maintenance 
problem (Villagers or by the 
MGNREGS) 
Conflict between villagers and other 
external user group 
Caste, class and 
gender 
Guard (PWD duty) not 
monitoring effectively 
Conflict at the policy level Monitoring, 
reconstruction etc. 
Illegal harvesting, 
converting the channel 
networks 
Conflict between villagers and FD With the authority 
Land size, allocation 
problem between the large 
and small land holders. 
Conflicts related to forest boundary- 
where does the CPR begin and 





Fishing to diverting the 
water flow 




Insufficient water, flood 
problem 
Conflicts for appropriation rules   Operator 
(technician) 
Time of water supply and 
collecting  




Allocation wit in same land 
holding. 
Conflicts over unequal contributions 
to manage the forest 
Tank condition 
(working conditions) 
Power status-caste and 
class 
Governance such as forest guard Tank bed (channel 
networks) 
Deficiency of the gate 
system or the chain system 
Clearing (Planting) 
 
Distance from the 
sources  
Quota, not equal distribution 
by the canal department 
Hazardous activities  Availability of water 
and the level of 
water 
Water not reachable to 
every plots 
Basic Infrastructure. (Spade, Hoe, 
Grubber, Fencing) 
Fishery and 
domestic activities 
 
 
